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Here, we investigate the security of the practical one-way CVQKD and CV-MDI-QKD systems under laser
seeding attack. In particular, Eve can inject a suitable light into the laser diodes of the light source modules
in the two kinds of practical CVQKD systems, which results in the increased intensity of the generated optical
signal. The parameter estimation under the attack shows that the secret key rates of these two schemes may be
overestimated, which opens a security loophole for Eve to successfully perform an intercept-resend attack on
these systems. To close this loophole, we propose a real-time monitoring scheme to precisely evaluate the secret
key rates of these schemes. The analysis results indicate the implementation of the proposed monitoring scheme
can effectively resist this potential attack.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.-a, 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a promising technol-
ogy, which enables two authorized communication parties Al-
ice and Bob to share a string of secret keys through an inse-
cure quantum channel in the presence of a potential eaves-
dropper Eve [1–4]. In theory, the basic laws of quantum
physics guarantee the unconditional security of this technol-
ogy [5–7]. At present, QKD technology can be implemented
by two kinds of different means, i.e., discrete-variable quan-
tum key distribution (DVQKD) and continuous-variable quan-
tum key distribution (CVQKD). Different from DVQKD sys-
tems, CVQKD systems rely on continuous modulation of the
light field quadratures, which can be measured by utilizing the
mature coherent detection technique instead of single-photon
detection [3, 4]. Therefore, CVQKD systems can be well
compatible with the classical optical communication systems.
In particular, CVQKD with the Gaussian-modulated coherent
states (GMCS) is one well-known protocol, which has been
proven to be secure against the collective and coherent attacks
[7]. Over the past years, the GMCS CVQKD scheme has
been experimentally implemented by many research groups
in laboratories and in field environment [8–11]. In this work,
we also focus on the investigation of the GMCS CVQKD
schemes.
As we all known that the implemented devices (e.g., laser,
modulators, detetors) of the GMCS CVQKD schemes is as-
sumed to be secure and perfect in the security proofs [7]. In
fact, however, there are some direct or indirect imperfections
in practical GMCS CVQKD systems [12]. These imperfec-
tions can be divided into two categories. First, some imperfec-
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tions may open several security loopholes. In particular, Eve
can exploit these loopholes to steal key information without
being detected, which seriously threatens the practical secu-
rity of the systems. This is an effective quantum hacking strat-
egy, such as the local oscillator (LO) fluctuation attack [13],
the LO calibration attack [14], the wavelength attack [15–17],
the saturation attack [18], finite sampling bandwidth effects
[19], homodyne detector blinding attack [20], jitter in clock
synchronization [21], and the polarization attack [22]. Sec-
ond, the other imperfections can simply deteriorate the per-
formance of the systems, such as imperfect phase compensa-
tion [23], finite-size effects [24], and the noisy coherent states
[25–29]. These imperfections hinder the commercial applica-
tion of CVQKD.
Subsequently, several strategies have been designed to re-
move these imperfections. For the first imperfections that
can open security loopholes, countermeasures are proposed
to improve existing systems. For example, a real-time shot-
noise measurement (RTSNM) scheme is used to resist the at-
tacks originating from the local oscillator (LO) signal [14, 30].
Then, a local LO (LLO) CVQKD scheme is designed and
implemented experimentally, which can fundamentally close
the security loophole originates from LO [31–35]. Another
attractive approach is to improve GMCS CVQKD proto-
col directly, i.e., continuous-variable measurement-device-
independent quantum key distribution with the Gaussian-
modulated coherent states (GMCS CV-MDI-QKD) protocol,
which is immune to all detector side-channel attacks [36–41].
To remove the second imperfections, the reasonable noise
models are needed to precisely evaluate the performance of
the system. It is important to note that the above countermea-
sures do not close all potential loopholes, and new proposed
attacks may defeat the CVQKD system. Therefore, the dis-
coveries and preventions of the concealed security loopholes
are vital to the commercial application of CVQKD.
Light source is one of key devices for the implementation
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2of QKD systems, which is assumed to be trusted in previ-
ous research. For instance, in CVQKD, the noisy Gaussian
source is well studied and modeled [28, 29]. However, the pa-
rameters of the light source may be actively tampered by Eve
[42–44]. In particular, based on the framework of GMCS CV-
MDI-QKD, the sources become the final battlefield between
the authorized communication parties and Eve. Therefore, the
effects of the tampered source should be considered for the
security analysis of practical CVQKD systems, which has not
been well studied.
More recently, Huang et al . proposed an efficient quan-
tum hacking strategy related with light source to attack the
DVQKD systems, which is called as laser seeding attack [42].
In this quantum hacking scheme, Eve can inject bright light
into the laser diode of the systems to actively open a loop-
hole. In this paper, inspired by this quantum hacking attack
in DVQKD, we study the security of practical CVQKD sys-
tems under the laser seeding attack. Here, we focus on several
well-known CVQKD protocols, i.e., the standard one-way
GMCS CVQKD and GMCS CV-MDI-QKD schemes. More
specifically, we first reveal that Eve can exploit the laser seed-
ing attack to make the intensity of the transmitted Gaussian-
modulated coherent states increased. Then, we find that the
laser seeding attack makes the quantum channel excess noises
of these two systems underestimated. Subsequently, we show
that the secret key rates of these two systems are overesti-
mated by Alice and Bob under the attack. These imperfect
evaluative results are coincident with the security analysis re-
sults of CVQKD under the effects of the reduced optical at-
tenuation caused by the laser damage attack [45–47], which
indicates that the laser seeding attack can also open a secu-
rity loophole for Eve to perform an intercept-resend attack on
these two kinds of CVQKD systems without being detected.
In particular, although the CV-MDI-QKD protocols can re-
move all side channels originate from measurement unit, we
observe that it is more vulnerable than the one-way CVQKD
schemes to the laser seeding attack. Finally, we design a coun-
termeasure to resist the laser seeding attack, where the inten-
sity of optical signal generated by light source is monitored by
the authorized communication parties in real time. The anal-
ysis result indicates that the legitimate communication parties
can precisely evaluate the channel parameters to accurately
calculate the secret key rate of these two systems through this
scheme.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, the laser
seeding attack is described and modeled. Then, the security
of various CVQKD systems under the laser seeding attack is
studied in Sec. III. In Sec. IV, we investigate the countermea-
sure to resist the laser seeding attack. Finally, conclusions are
presented in Sec. V.
II. PRINCIPLE OF THE LASER SEEDING ATTACK
A. Scheme of laser seeding attack
In Ref. [42], Huang et al . proposed the laser seeding attack
and demonstrated that Eve may perform the attack in the light
source of a practical DVQKD system to steal key information
without being detected, which seriously destroys the practical
security of the system. Fig. 1 shows the scheme of the laser
seeding attack clearly according to the experimental results in
Ref. [42]. Specifically, Eve can utilize a tunable continuous-
wave laser to inject a bright light with a proper wavelength
into the semiconductor laser diode of a DVQKD system via
quantum channel, where the semiconductor laser diode gen-
erates the optical signals driven by the electrical signals. In
particular, a polarization controller is used for adjusting the
polarization of the injected light signal to maximize the injec-
tion efficiency. According to the analyses in Ref. [42], we
describe the two curves of power of the optical signal gener-
ated by the laser diode varying with time in the laser seeding
attack case and ideal case, respectively. The laser seeding at-
tack will cause two main effects on the ideal curve, which are
shown in Fig. 1. The first impact is that the curve becomes
wider with a much higher and longer tail. The other influence
is that the peak of the curve shifts to earlier compared with the
ideal situation. Here, we use P (t) and P ′(t) to represent the
power of the output optical signal in ideal situation and with
the attack, respectively. Then, the intensity of the optical sig-
nal prepared by light source without the laser seeding attack
can be calculated as
I = µ
∫ T
0
P (t)dt, (1)
where T is the period of the optical pulse emitted by laser
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FIG. 1: The schematic diagram of the laser seeding attack. CD Cir-
cuit, current driver circuit; CW Laser, continuous-wave laser; LD,
laser diode; PC, polarization controller; P (t), the power of the opti-
cal signal emitted by a laser diode without the laser seeding attack;
P ′(t), the power of the optical signal emitted by a laser diode with
the attack; A, the generated signal without the attack; A′, the gener-
ated signal with attack; I , the intensity of the pulse signal generated
by the light source module without the attack; I ′, the intensity of the
pulse signal generated by the light source module with the attack.
diode, µ is a certain coefficient related with detection. Here,
we assume that the parameters T and µ are fixed and unaf-
fected by the laser seeding attack. Correspondingly, the in-
tensity I ′ of the optical signal generated by the attacked light
source can also be acquired by Eq. (1). It is obvious that
the intensity of the optical signal prepared by the light source
gets larger under the effects of the laser seeding attack. For
3simplicity, we assume that I ′ = gI(g > 1) in the following
analysis. Here, g reflects the power of the laser seeding attack.
Similarly, in practical CVQKD systems, light source is also
a key device, which can be used for generating information
carrier signal and LO signal in the transmitter Alice. In par-
ticular, light source is also used in Bob’s side for a CV-MDI-
QKD system. In implementations of CVQKD, the semicon-
ductor laser diode is also widely used to generate the optical
signals driven by the electrical signals. For example, 100 ns
coherent light pulses can be prepared for CVQKD by using a
1550 nm laser diode at a repetition rate of 1 Mhz [10]. There-
fore, Eve may perform the laser seeding attack in a CVQKD
system. In the following sections, we will focus on the the-
oretical security research of various CVQKD systems under
the laser seeding attack.
B. The effects of the laser seeding attack in a CVQKD system
In the practical implementation of a standard one-way
GMCS CVQKD system, Alice modulates the random key in-
formation to the pulse signal A, which can result in a series
of Gaussian-modulated coherent states |α〉 [3]. After optical
attenuation, we use |αA0〉 to indicate the transmitted coherent
states. Based on the phase space, |αA0〉 can be written as
|αA0〉 = |αA0 |eiθ = xA0 + ipA0 ,
xA0 = |αA0 | cos θ, pA0 = |αA0 | sin θ,
(2)
where |αA0 | and θ indicate the amplitude and phase of the
transmitted Gaussian-modulated optical signal A0, respec-
tively. In particular, xA0 and pA0 are two independent quadra-
tures variables with identical variance VA0 and zero mean
[3, 4].
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FIG. 2: The expression of the transmitted Gaussian-modulated co-
herent states in the phase space under the lase seeding attack.
However, the generated optical signal A can change under
the laser seeding attack. Therefore, xA0 , pA0 , and VA0 may
deviate from their ideal values due to the influences of the
attack, which is revealed in Fig. 2 based on the phase space.
Since I ∝ |αA0 |, the changes of xA0 , pA0 , and VA0 are as
follows:
x′A0 =
√
gxA0 , p
′
A0 =
√
gpA0 ,
V ′A0 = gVA0 ,
(3)
where x′A0 and p
′
A0
are two independent quadratures variables
of the transmitted quantum signal A′0 with the attack, V
′
A0
are
the variance of x′A0 or p
′
A0
. Similarly, the effects also exist in
a CV-MDI-QKD system.
In addition, it is important to note that the intensity of LO
signal can also become large with the increase of the inten-
sity of the generated optical signal A. In a practical CVQKD
system, there are many reasons for the increase of the inten-
sity of LO signal, such as the decrease of optical attenuation
[45]. Although the origin of the change is ambiguous for Al-
ice and Bob, the real-time shot-noise measurement technique
can eliminate the impact. Therefore, we do not have to con-
sider the influences of the increased intensity of the LO signal
in the following analysis.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Security of a one-way GMCS CVQKD system under the
laser seeding attack
The analyses in Sec. II indicate that the laser seeding at-
tack will lead to the increased intensity of the transmitted
Gaussian-modulated coherent states, which is the same as the
influences of the reduced optical attenuation caused by the
laser damage attack [45–49]. Therefore, based on the anal-
yses in Ref. [45], it is feasible that Eve can unconsciously
steal key information shared by Alice and Bob in a one-way
GMCS CVQKD system by using the laser seeding attack. The
analysis result indicates that the enhancement of the transmit-
ted Gaussian-modulated coherent states can open a security
loophole for Eve to attack a one-way GMCS CVQKD system
without trace.
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FIG. 3: Secret key rate vs transmission distance for different powers
g of the laser seeding attack when ε = 0.01, 0.05, respectively. Solid
curves from top to bottom represent the relations between the evalu-
ated secret key rate Ke and the transmission distance. Dotted curves
show the corresponding practical secret key rate Kp vs transmission
distance under different situations. The fiber loss is 0.2 dB/km.
Further, whatever the reason for the increased intensity of
the transmitted Gaussian-modulated coherent states, we can
4use the analysis method presented in [45] to investigate the
practical security of the system under this loophole. Thus,
we no longer describe the calculation process of the secret
key rate for the system under the laser seeding attack. Fig.
3 depicts the relationship between the secret key rate and the
transmission distance for the one-way GMCS CVQKD sys-
tem under the laser seeding attack when ε = 0.01, 0.05. The
fixed parameters for the simulation are set as: VA0 = 4, η =
0.5, νel = 0.01, β = 95%,  = 10
−10,m = 0.5 ×N , respec-
tively.
It is clear that the evaluative secret key rate Ke under
the laser seeding attack are overestimated compared with the
practical secret key rate Kp in the same situation. These re-
sults also demonstrate that the laser seeding attack can open
a security loophole for Eve to perform an intercept-resend at-
tack in a practical one-way CVQKD system. In particular,
the gap between the estimated secret key rate and the corre-
sponding practical secret key rate represents the key informa-
tion that can be acquired by Eve through the intercept-resend
attack. We find that the leaking of the secret key information
ascends with the power of the laser seeding attack. In addi-
tion, Eve can acquire more secret key information in the case
of a larger excess noise ε under the same attack power of laser
seeding attack.
B. Security of GMCS CV-MDI-QKD systems under the laser
seeding attack
In GMCS CV-MDI-QKD systems, the two sources be-
come the only region that can be exploited by Eve. Here,
these sources are the same as the source of one-way GMCS
CVQKD systems. Therefore, it is possible that Eve attacks
these sources actively. In the following analysis, we will in-
vestigate the practical security of CV-MDI-QKD systems un-
der the laser seeding attack in detail.
1. The estimated channel parameters under the laser seeding
attack
Although CV-MDI-QKD can remove all known or un-
known side-channel attacks on detectors, Eve may perform
the laser seeding attack on the light source module in a prac-
tical CV-MDI-QKD system. Therefore, it is essential that
the practical security of a CV-MDI-QKD system under the
laser seeding attack is investigated. In Fig. 4, we describe
the equivalent entanglement-based (EB) model of the CV-
MDI-QKD schemes. Specifically, Alice and Bob first gen-
erate one two-mode squeezed state with variance VA + 1
and VB + 1, respectively. Here, the mode A1 (B1) is re-
tained by Alice (Bob), the other mode A2 (B2) is sent to
an untrusted third party Charlie through the quantum chan-
nel with length LAC (LBC). The total transmission distance
LAB is equal to LAC + LBC . Subsequently, Charlie inter-
feres two modes A′ and B′ at a beam splitter (BS) with two
output modes C and D. Then, both the quadrature variable
xC of mode C and quadrature variable pD of mode D are
measured by Charlie through homodyne detection, and he an-
nounces the measurement results {xC , pD} through a public
channel [36, 37]. Finally, Bob modifies mode B1 to B′1 by
displacement operation D (β), where β = gm (xC + ipD),
and gm represents the gain of the displacement operation.
After through these procedures, mode A1 and B′1 become
entangled. Accordingly, Alice and Bob will share a group
correlated vectors X = {(xA0 i, xB0 i) |i = 1, 2, . . . , N } or
P = {(pA0 i, pB0 i) |i = 1, 2, . . . , N } after the quadratures of
modeB′1 and modA1 are measured by employing heterodyne
detection. It is notable that Alice and Bob implement informa-
tion reconciliation and privacy amplification to obtain a string
of secret key.
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FIG. 4: EB scheme of the CV-MDI-QKD protocols. EPR, two-mode
squeezed state; Het, heterodyne detection; Hom, homodyne detec-
tion; D (β), displacement operation.
It is obvious that there are two quantum channels which sat-
isfy with linear model in a CV-MDI-QKD system. Here, the
excess noise and transmittance of the quantum channel be-
tween Alice (Bob) and Charlie are expressed by εAC (εBC)
and TAC (TBC). Since the transmission of the Gaussian-
modulated quantum coherent states before the interference
in Charlie’s apparatus is the same with the one-way GMCS
CVQKD systems, the involved two quantum channels can
also be modeled as a normal linear model with the following
relations:
xA′0 = tACxA0 + zAC ,
pA′0 = tACpA0 + zAC ,
xB′0 = tBCxB0 + zBC ,
pB′0 = tBCpB0 + zBC ,
(4)
where xA0 (pA0 ), xA′0 (pA′0 ), xB0 (pB0 ) and xB′0 (pB′0 ) are
the values of the quadrature variables of mode A2, A′, B2 and
B′, respectively. Here, tAC =
√
TAC , tBC =
√
TBC , zAC
and zBC are the total noises in the two quantum channels that
obeys two centered normal distribution with variance σ2AC =
TACξAC+N0 and σ2BC = TBCξBC+N0, respectively. These
variances include shot noise N0, channel excess noises ξAC
and ξBC .
Based on the above analyses, we can obtain the following
5relations [37–40]:
〈x2A0〉 =〈p2A0〉 = VxA0 = VpA0 ,
〈x2B0〉 =〈p2B0〉 = VxB0 = VpB0 ,
〈x2C〉 =〈p2D〉 =
1
2
η(TACVxA0 + TBCVxB0 ) +N0
+ Vel +
1
2
η(TACξAC + TBCξBC),
〈xA0xC〉 =
√
ηTAC
2
VxA0 , 〈pB0pD〉 =
√
ηTBC
2
VpB0 ,
〈xCxD〉 =〈pCpD〉 = 1
2
η(TACVxA0 − TBCVxB0 )
+
1
2
η(TACξAC − TBCξBC).
(5)
According to Eq. (5), we can further get
〈x2C〉+ 〈xCxD〉 =ηTACVxA0 + ηTACξAC +N0 + Vel,
〈p2D〉 − 〈pCpD〉 =ηTBCVxB0 + ηTBCξBC +N0 + Vel.
(6)
In particular, we here assume that these detectors located in
Charlie’s side have identical detection efficiency η and elec-
tronic noise Vel. Moreover, in the evaluation of the secret
key rate, the above parameters VxA0 , VxB0 , ξAC , ξBC and
Vel must be calculated in shot-noise unit, i.e., VAN0, VBN0,
εACN0, εBCN0 and νelN0, respectively.
By using Eqs. (5) and (6), the channel parameters TAC ,
TBC , εAC and εBC can be estimated by
TAC =
2〈xA0xC〉2
η〈x2A0〉2
,
TBC =
2〈pB0pD〉2
η〈p2B0〉2
,
εAC =
〈x2C〉+ 〈xCxD〉 −N0 − νelN0
2(〈xA0xC〉/〈x2A0〉)2N0
− 〈x
2
A0
〉
N0
,
εBC =
〈p2D〉 − 〈pCpD〉 −N0 − νelN0
2(〈pB0pD〉/〈p2B0〉)2N0
− 〈p
2
B0
〉
N0
.
(7)
It is important to note that the quadrature variable pC of mode
C or quadrature variable xD of mode D needs also to be mea-
sured for estimating these channel parameters. Therefore, we
should use a heterodyne detector to replace one of the two ho-
modyne detectors. More importantly, the above investigations
are based on the fact that the CV-MDI-QKD can remove all
side-channel attacks on detectors. Therefore, we consider that
the precision of the estimated parameters are not limited by
the detectors in Charlie’s side.
However, the analyses of Sec. II indicate that the estimated
values may be affected by the laser seeding attack. In order to
clearly show this influence, we here consider the worst case,
which is that the two light source modules of the system is
simultaneously attacked. For simplicity, we assume that the
attack power is the same (i.e., g1 = g2 = g) and do not con-
sider the other attack situations. Therefore, these quadrature
variable xA0 (pA0 ), xB0 (pB0 ), xC (pC) and xD (pD) will be-
come
x′A0 =
√
gxA0 , p
′
A0 =
√
gpA0 ,
x′B0 =
√
gxB0 , p
′
B0 =
√
gpB0 ,
x′C =
√
gxC , p
′
C =
√
gpC ,
x′D =
√
gxD, p
′
D =
√
gpD.
(8)
In a practical CV-MDI-QKD system, if Alice and Bob are
not aware of the laser seeding attack, they still use xA0 and
pB0 to estimate the channel parameters. Therefore, these re-
lations in Eq. (7) kept by Alice, Bob and Charlie become
T ′AC =
2〈xA0x′C〉2
η〈x2A0〉2
= gTAC ,
T ′BC =
2〈pB0p′D〉2
η〈p2B0〉2
= gTBC ,
ε′AC =
〈(x′C)2〉+ 〈x′Cx′D〉 −N0 − νelN0
2(〈xA0x′C〉/〈x2A0〉)2N0
− 〈x
2
A0
〉
N0
=
εAC
g
,
ε′BC =
〈(p′D)2〉 − 〈p′Cp′D〉 −N0 − νelN0
2(〈pB0p′D〉/〈p2B0〉)2N0
− 〈p
2
B0
〉
N0
=
εBC
g
.
(9)
There are some obvious deviations caused by the laser seed-
ing attack between Eq. (7) and Eq. (9). It is obvious that these
channel excess noises are underestimated under the laser seed-
ing attack. Therefore, Eve may perform a classical intercept-
resend attack to collect key information without trace under
the shield of the laser seeding attack, which illustrates that a
loophole will occurs in a practical CV-MDI-QKD system. In
order to clearly show the loophole, we cite a specific partial
intercept-resend (PIR) attack to analyze the security of a prac-
tical CV-MDI-QKD system in presence of the laser seeding
attack in the next section.
2. A quantitative example
The intercept-resend attack plays an important role as one
part of most quantum hacking strategies. In the quantum hack-
ing scheme based on the laser seeding attack, Eve may also
exploit the classical intercept-resend attack to collect key in-
formation. Therefore, we first investigate the PIR attack be-
tween Alice and Charlie under the laser seeding attack. In
the PIR attack, the probability distribution of quadrature vari-
able of mode A′ in Charlie’s apparatus is weighted sum of
two Gaussian distributions, i.e., the distribution of the inter-
cepted resend data with a weight of u and the distribution of
the transmitted data with a weight of 1 − u [14, 50]. Further,
the extra excess noise caused by Eve in the implementation of
the PIR attack can be expressed by 2uN0. In principle, the to-
tal excess noise estimated by Alice and Charlie under the PIR
attack can be represented as
ξPIR,AC = ξt,AC + 2uN0, (10)
6where ξt,AC = εt,ACN0 is the technical excess noise. Ex-
pressed in shot-noise, the estimated excess noise ξPIR,AC can
be computed as
εPIR,AC = εt,AC + 2u. (11)
With loss of generality, we assign 0.1 to u. Correspondingly,
the excess noise εPIR,AC estimated by Alice and Charlie can
become εt,AC + 0.2. In this case, the estimated excess noise
under the laser seeding attack should be rewritten as
ε′PIR,AC =
εt,AC + 0.2
g
. (12)
In the practical implementation of a CV-MDI-QKD system,
we assume that the technical excess noise εt,AC = 0.1. There-
fore, when Eve performs the PIR attack, the estimated total
excess noise under the laser seeding attack can be calculated
as ε′PIR,AC =
0.3
g . Before the execution of the laser seed-
ing attack, the noise value is 0.3, which obviously exceeds
the ideal value. Accordingly, the process of key distribution
is interrupted to guarantee the security of the system. How-
ever, we find that the estimated total excess noise can be re-
duced by Eve with the help of the laser seeding attack. When
g = 3, the estimated total excess noise ε′PIR,AC = 0.1, i.e.,
the ideal noise value without attack. It has been experimen-
tally demonstrated that g can equal 3 under the control of Eve
[42]. The result indicates that Eve can perform the laser seed-
ing attack to make the PIR attack hidden. In particular, Eve
can perform a full intercept-resend (FIR) attack in the case of
u = 1. Although the FIR attack is the most powerful, it can
also be hidden when Eve makes g exceeds 21. These analysis
results fully demonstrate that the extra excess noise induced
by the intercept-resend attack can be completely concealed by
Eve through the laser seeding attack. Similarly, the excess
noise induced by the intercept-resend attack between Bob and
Charlie can also be concealed by Eve with the help of the laser
seeding attack. Therefore, the laser seeding attack will open
a loophole for Eve to successfully hide her attacks, which se-
riously destroys the security of the practical CV-MDI-QKD
system.
3. Secret key rate under the laser seeding attack
In this section, we mainly focus on the secret key rate of a
CV-MDI-QKD scheme under one-mode collective Gaussian
attack, where Bob performs reverse reconciliation. We here
point out that this one-mode attack is not the optimal strategy.
In particular, the two-mode attack is demonstrated to be the
optimal attack [36]. More concretely, Eve performs correlated
two-mode coherent Gaussian attack on two quantum channels
by employing their interactions. However, in a practical CV-
MDI-QKD system, the correlation of the two quantum chan-
nels can become very weak when they come from different
directions. Therefore, the quantum channel of CV-MDI-QKD
can be reduced to one-mode channel in this context. Here,
Eve can efficiently perform the one-mode attack.
It has been demonstrated that the CV-MDI-QKD schemes
is equivalent to the one-way CVQKD protocols using coher-
ent states and heterodyne detection when the preparation of
Bob’s EPR states and the displacement operation of Bob are
assumed to be untrusted [38]. Therefore, the calculation pro-
cess of secret key rate of CV-MDI-QKD protocols is the same
with the one-way GMCS CVQKD. In the following analysis,
we assume that the heterodyne detection is perfect and do not
consider the finite-size effect, which does not affect our anal-
ysis results. Here, the shannon mutual information between
Alice and Bob becomes [51]
IhetAB = 2×
1
2
log2
V hetB
V hetB|A
= log2
VA + 1 + χline,m
1 + χline,m
, (13)
where V hetB = ηTm(VA + 1 + χline,m)/2, V
het
B|A = ηTm(1 +
χline,m)/2 and χline,m = 1/Tm − 1 + εm. Furthermore, the
vital covariance matrix ΓmAB between Alice and Bob can be
expressed as
ΓmAB = (VA + 1) I
√
Tm
[
(VA + 1)
2 − 1
]
σZ√
Tm
[
(VA + 1)
2 − 1
]
σZ (TmVA + 1 + Tmεm)I
 ,
(14)
where
Tm =
TAC
2
k2,
εm =1 +
1
TAC
[2 + TBC(εBC − 2) + TAC(εBC − 1)]
+
1
TAC
(√
2
k
√
VB −
√
TBC
√
VB + 2
)2
.
(15)
In order to minimize εm, we adopt k =
√
2VB
TBC(VB+2)
; then
εm =
TBC
TAC
(εBC − 2) + εAC + 2
TAC
. (16)
According to Refs. [24, 51], the Holevo bound can be ob-
tained as
χBE = G(
λm,1 − 1
2
)+G(
λm,2 − 1
2
)−G(λm,3 − 1
2
). (17)
Here,
λ2m,1,2 =
1
2
(Am ±
√
A2m − 4Bm),
λm,3 =
(Tmεm + 2)(VA + 1)− TmVA
Tm(εm + VA) + 2
,
(18)
where
Am =(VA + 1)
2 − 2Tm(V 2A + 2VA)
+ (TmVA + Tmεm + 1)
2,
Bm =[(Tmεm + 1)(VA + 1)− TmVA]2.
(19)
7Eventually, the secret key rate against collective attacks for
the CV-MDI-QKD schemes is calculated as
Km = βI
het
AB − χBE . (20)
The analysis indicates that the secret key rate of the
system can be expressed as Km = K(VA, VB , Tm, εm).
When Alice and Bob are not aware of the laser seed-
ing attack, the evaluative secret key rate is expressed as
Km,e = K(VA, VB , Tm, ε
′
m). However, the practical se-
cret key rate of the system should be computed as Km,p =
K(V ′A, V
′
B , T
′
m, εm). Here,
V ′A = gVA, V
′
B = gVB ,
T ′m =
gTACVB
TBC(gVB + 2)
,
ε′m =
TBC
TAC
(
εBC
g
− 2) + εAC
g
+
2
gTAC
.
(21)
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FIG. 5: Secret key rate as a function of the transmission distance
from Alice to Bob for different excess noise in the symmetric case,
where LAC = LBC . Solid curves from top to bottom represent the
relations between the evaluated secret key rate Km,e and the trans-
mission distance when εAC = εBC = 0.01, 0.05. Dotted curves
show the corresponding practical secret key rate Km,p versus trans-
mission distance. The fiber loss is 0.2 dB/km.
Next, we simulate the secret key rate versus transmission
distance in the symmetric and extreme asymmetric case when
Eve performs the laser seeding attack in the two light source
modules of a practical CV-MDI-QKD system. Fig. 5 shows
the secret key rate versus transmission distance in the symmet-
ric case under different excess noise environment when the at-
tack power g = 1.02. In the simulation analysis, the involved
parameters are fixed as follows. VA = VB = 40, η = 0.6,
εAC = εBC = 0.01, 0.05, β = 95%, respectively. We ob-
serve that there is an obvious gap between the secret key rate
estimated by Alice and Bob and the practical secret key rate.
The results indicate that Eve can perform the intercept-resend
attack without trace to steal key information in a practical CV-
MDI-QKD system.
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FIG. 6: Secret key rate vs the transmission distance from Alice to
Bob for different excess noise environments in the extreme asym-
metric case, where LBC = 0. Solid curves from top to bottom rep-
resent the relations between the evaluated secret key rate Km,e and
the transmission distance when εAC = εBC = 0.01, 0.05. Dotted
curves show the corresponding practical secret key rate Km,p versus
transmission distance.
Fig. 6 reveals the secret key rate of the system as a function
of the transmission distance from Alice to Bob in the extreme
asymmetric case when the excess noise εAC and εBC are as-
sumed to be 0.01 or 0.05. Here, the attack power g = 1.02,
and the other parameters for the simulation are fixed values
that has been confirmed in the analysis of the symmetric case.
It is obvious that the secret key rate calculated by Alice and
Bob is overestimated compared with the practical secret key
rate. In particular, we find that the CV-MDI-QKD systems are
more sensitive to the laser seeding attack than the one-way
GMCS CVQKD system. A slight attack power can have a
major impact on the evaluative value of secret key rate of the
CV-MDI-QKD systems, especially in the extreme asymmetric
case.
The above investigations demonstrate that the laser seeding
attack opens a security loophole for Eve to obtain information
about secret key without trace in a practical CV-MDI-QKD
system, which seriously destroys the practical security of the
system.
IV. COUNTERMEASURE AGAINST THE LASER
SEEDING ATTACK
The above investigations show that the laser seeding attack
affects the parameter estimation and the evaluative secret key
rate. To resist this attack, we can exploit an appropriate iso-
lator to prevent the injected light. However, it is important to
note that Eve might reduce the performance of the isolator by
laser damage attack. Therefore, we here propose a real-time
monitoring scheme for the intensity of output optical signal
in light source module to prevent the incorrect estimation of
8channel parameters. According to the analysis of Section. II,
we find that the intensity of the LO signal can simultaneously
change under the effects of the laser seeding attack. There-
fore, the attack can be directly found by monitoring the inten-
sity of the LO signal in real time before attenuation.
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FIG. 7: The structure of the real-time monitoring scheme against the
laser seeding attack in Alice’s apparatus for the one-way CVQKD
stsyems. AM, amplitude modulator; PM, phase modulator; BS, beam
splitter; PBS, polarizing beam splitter; FM, faraday mirror; DL, de-
lay line; LO, local oscillator; VOA, variable optical attenuator; PD,
photodiode.
Fig. 7 shows the countermeasure against the laser seeding
attack for the one-way CVQKD systems in Alice’s appara-
tus. Specifically, Alice first splits a fraction of the undimin-
ished LO signal to measure its intensity by using a photodiode.
Here, the practical value of the intensity of the undiminished
LO signal is Ip, which can also be automatically predicted by
using machine learning [52]. Then, Alice can calculate the
value of g by comparing the difference between the measured
value and the preset value I0 of the separated LO signal, i.e.,
g =
Ip
Io
=
V ′A0
VA0
. Eventually, according to Ref. [45], Alice
and Bob can precisely evaluate the secret key rate of the sys-
tem, i.e., Km = K(gVA0 ,
T ′
g , gε
′, νel) = Kp. These analy-
ses demonstrate that the real-time monitoring scheme can help
Alice and Bob to precisely estimate the channel parameters of
the system. Finally, the secret key rate of the CVQKD systems
under the laser seeding attack can be precisely evaluated with
the help of this scheme. The accurate evaluation of secret key
rate can effectively close this security loophole. In particular,
in a LLO CVQKD system, Alice can split a fraction of undi-
minished reference signal to monitor its intensity in real-time
to close this loophole. In addition, the loss of the LO signal in
the above scheme can be completely compensated by properly
adjusting the preset value of the attenuation level of the VOA
in the light path of LO.
It is important to note that this real-time monitoring scheme
can equally remove the loophole induced by the laser seeding
attack in a practical CV-MDI-QKD system. Here, the two
light sources of the system should be simultaneously moni-
tored by adding the monitoring module which is shown in Fig.
7. More concretely, the monitoring scheme also makes the
secret key rate evaluated precisely to resist the laser seeding
attack. For example, in the case of the same attack power, the
parameter g can be acquired by g = g1 = g2 =
Ip1
I0
=
Ip2
I0
.
Next, the secret key rate of the system can be evaluated as
Km,e = K(gVA, gVB , T
′
m, εm) = Km,p. The analysis result
indicates that the proposed real-time monitoring scheme can
effectively resist the laser seeding attack to close this security
loophole.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work we have studied the security of several practical
CVQKD systems under the laser seeding attack. More specif-
ically, we have studied the standard one-way GMCS CVQKD
protocols in reverse reconciliation, and GMCS CV-MDI-QKD
schemes in the symmetric case and extreme asymmetric case.
Here, we consider that Eve can carry out the laser seeding
attack in the laser sources of the two kinds of CVQKD sys-
tems. We show that the intensity of the transmitted Gaussian-
modulated quantum optical signals can become large with the
increase of the intensity of optical signals prepared by the light
source module under the attack.
For the practical one-way CVQKD systems, we observe
that the effects of the laser seeding attack are similar with the
influences of the reduced optical attenuation caused by laser
damage attack. Therefore, the laser seeding attack opens a
loophole for Eve in the system. We further show that the laser
seeding attack makes the secret key rate of the system over-
estimated, which also demonstrates the attack can help Eve to
hide herself. In particular, Eve can obtain more key informa-
tion for the case of a larger channel excess noise in the same
attack power. In order to close this loophole, we propose a
real-time monitoring scheme for the intensity of the optical
signal generated by the light source module by measuring the
intensity of the LO signal before attenuation. This scheme can
make Alice and Bob precisely evaluate the channel parameters
to accurately analyse the performance of the system.
Apart from this, we mainly investigate the laser seeding at-
tack for the effects of the security of a practical CV-MDI-QKD
system. We find that these channel excess noises of the sys-
tem are underestimated under the laser seeding attack, which
indicates that the attack can open a security loophole for Eve
to successfully perform an intercept-resend attack. Although
the CV-MDI-QKD system can remove all side channels from
the measurement unit, Eve can also successfully perform the
laser seeding attack in the two light source modules of the sys-
tem to steal key information without being detected. We also
find that the CV-MDI-QKD schemes are more sensitive to the
laser seeding attack compared with the one-way CVQKD pro-
tocols. It is notable that the proposed real-time monitoring
scheme can also close this loophole in a practical CV-MDI-
QKD system.
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